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   Abstract	  Due	  to	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  legal	  domain,	  reasoning	  about	  law	  cases	  is	  a	  very	  complex	  skill.	  For	  novices	  in	  law	  school,	  legal	  reasoning	  is	  even	  more	  complex	  because	  they	  have	  not	  yet	  acquired	  the	  conceptual	  knowledge	  needed	  for	  distilling	  the	  relevant	  information	  from	  cases,	  determining	  applicable	  rules,	  and	  searching	  for	  rules	  and	  exceptions	  in	  external	  information	  sources	  such	  as	  lawbooks.	  This	  study	  investigated	  the	  role	  of	  conceptual	  knowledge	  in	  solving	  legal	  cases	  when	  no	  information	  sources	  can	  be	  used.	  Under	  such	  ‘unsupported’	  circumstances,	  novice	  and	  advanced	  students	  performed	  less	  well	  than	  domain	  experts,	  but	  even	  experts’	  performance	  was	  rather	  low.	  The	  second	  question	  addressed	  was	  whether	  novices	  even	  benefit	  from	  the	  availability	  of	  information	  sources	  (i.e.,	  lawbook),	  because	  conceptual	  knowledge	  is	  prerequisite	  for	  effective	  use	  of	  such	  sources.	  Indeed	  availability	  of	  the	  lawbook	  positively	  affected	  performance	  only	  for	  advanced	  students	  but	  not	  for	  novice	  students.	  Implications	  for	  learning	  and	  instruction	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  law	  are	  discussed.	  	  Keywords	  Higher	  eduction	  _	  Conceptual	  knowledge	  _	  Information	  sources	  _	  Reasoning	  _	  Novices	  _	  Experts	  _	  Cognitive	  load	  	  
Introduction	  Reasoning	  about	  cases	  is	  a	  key	  component	  of	  the	  legal	  profession,	  and	  consequently,	  of	  legal	  education.	  Legal	  reasoning	  is	  a	  complex	  cognitive	  skill	  (Stratman,	  2002),	  and	  this	  complexity	  results	  mostly	  from	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  legal	  domain	  (Blasi,	  1995).	  The	  legal	  domain	  differs	  from	  other	  domains	  such	  as	  medicine	  or	  engineering	  in	  that	  during	  task	  performance,	  professionals	  have	  to	  rely	  heavily	  on	  information	  sources,	  that	  is,	  books	  of	  reference	  such	  as	  lawbooks	  and	  jurisprudence	  (Sullivan	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Williams,	  1992).	  Consequently,	  the	  preferred	  method	  of	  instruction	  for	  learning	  to	  reason	  about	  law	  cases,	  is	  working	  on	  cases	  with	  the	  aid	  of	  the	  external	  information	  sources	  professionals	  in	  law	  would	  use.	  We	  argue	  here,	  however,	  that	  it	  is	  questionable	  whether	  this	  method	  of	  instruction	  is	  the	  most	  optimal	  one,	  especially	  for	  novice	  students,	  because	  they	  lack	  correct	  conceptual	  knowledge	  (Blasi,	  1995;	  Deegan,	  1995;	  Lindahl,	  2004;	  Nievelstein	  et	  al.,	  in	  press),	  which	  is	  needed	  to	  understand—and	  reason	  about—cases	  and	  external	  information.	  This	  study	  investigates	  the	  role	  of	  availability	  of	  conceptual	  knowledge	  in	  two	  ways.	  First	  by	  looking	  at	  how	  expertise	  influences	  reasoning	  about	  a	  case	  when	  no	  information	  sources	  are	  available.	  Second,	  it	  is	  investigated	  whether	  the	  availability	  of	  information	  sources	  actually	  helps	  students,	  especially	  novices,	  in	  solving	  legal	  cases.	  Before	  going	  into	  detail	  about	  the	  role	  that	  conceptual	  knowledge	  and	  information	  sources	  play	  in	  legal	  reasoning,	  we	  will	  first	  shortly	  describe	  commonalities	  and	  differences	  in	  legal	  reasoning	  between	  the	  Common	  Law	  and	  Civil	  Law	  systems.	  	  Common	  vs.	  civil	  law	  	  Despite	  differences	  between	  the	  systems,	  reasoning	  about	  legal	  cases	  is	  a	  complex	  skill	  both	  in	  Common	  Law	  (Anglo-­‐Saxon)	  and	  Civil	  Law	  (European-­‐Continental;	  Vandevelde,	  1996).	  To	  reason	  about	  legal	  problems	  in	  Common	  Law,	  lawyers	  rely	  heavily	  on	  applying	  jurisprudence,	  that	  is,	  on	  solving	  cases	  by	  analogy	  (Marchant	  et	  al.,	  1993).	  The	  structural	  characteristics	  (relevant	  legal	  facts	  and	  context)	  of	  a	  current	  case	  should	  be	  compared	  and	  contrasted	  with	  structural	  features	  of	  prior	  relevant	  cases	  to	  infer	  whether	  the	  same	  conclusion	  could	  be	  drawn	  (Aamodt	  &	  Plaza	  ,1994).	  In	  high	  court,	  a	  present	  case	  always	  has	  to	  be	  decided	  according	  to	  a	  past	  case	  judgement.	  In	  lower	  court,	  judges	  have	  the	  right	  to	  decide	  alternatively	  (Marchant	  et	  al.,	  1993;	  Vandevelde,	  1996).	  Analogical	  case-­‐based	  reasoning	  also	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  the	  Civil	  Law	  system,	  but	  less	  pronounced.	  In	  Civil	  Law,	  legal	  reasoning	  relies	  more	  heavily	  on	  interpretation	  and	  application	  of	  codified	  legal	  rules	  to	  cases	  (Stratman,,	  2004).	  The	  legal	  rules	  are	  codified	  for	  different	  law	  domains,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  civil	  code	  or	  the	  commercial	  code.	  Judges	  decide	  cases	  primarily	  based	  on	  the	  rules,	  but	  when	  the	  codes	  and	  statutes	  cannot	  give	  a	  decisive	  answer	  about	  the	  judgement	  on	  a	  legal	  problem,	  judges	  have	  to	  base	  their	  decision	  on	  similar	  past	  cases	  (Vandevelde	  1996).	  However,	  both	  in	  Common	  Law	  and	  in	  Civil	  Law,	  
conceptual	  knowledge	  and	  the	  use	  of	  information	  sources	  (i.e.,	  jurisprudence	  or	  codes)	  play	  a	  key	  role	  in	  reasoning	  about	  cases.	  	  The	  role	  of	  available	  conceptual	  knowledge	  and	  information	  sources	  in	  legal	  reasoning	  	  
Conceptual	  knowledge	  	  Having	  correct	  conceptual	  knowledge	  is	  prerequisite	  for	  correct	  legal	  reasoning	  (Deegan,	  1995;	  Lindahl,	  2004;	  Lundeberg,	  1987;	  Williams,	  1992).	  First	  of	  all,	  conceptual	  knowledge	  is	  required	  to	  understand	  the	  legal	  problem,	  that	  is,	  to	  decide	  what	  information	  in	  a	  particular	  case	  is	  important	  and	  what	  is	  redundant	  (i.e.,	  irrelevant).	  Second,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  decide	  what	  kind	  of	  rules	  or	  jurisprudence	  should	  be	  searched	  for,	  and	  to	  interpret	  and	  apply	  these	  correctly.	  Nievelstein	  et	  al.	  (in	  press)	  showed	  that	  novices	  and	  advanced	  students	  had	  less	  formal	  and	  less	  shared	  knowledge	  about	  legal	  concepts	  and	  the	  relations	  between	  those	  concepts	  than	  law	  experts.	  Formalized	  shared	  knowledge	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ontology	  of	  the	  domain	  (Bench-­‐Capon	  &	  Visser,	  1997;	  Chi	  &,	  Roscoe	  2002).	  The	  acquisition	  of	  correct	  conceptual	  knowledge	  is	  a	  difficult	  process	  in	  many	  domains,	  because	  many	  concepts	  that	  are	  routinely	  used	  in	  everyday	  language	  have	  a	  different	  formal	  meaning	  (see	  e.g.,	  Slotta	  &	  Chi,	  2006).	  This	  also	  occurs	  very	  often	  in	  the	  legal	  domain	  (see	  e.g.,	  Lindahl,	  2004;	  Lundeberg,	  1987).	  The	  findings	  of	  Nievelstein	  et	  al.	  also	  showed	  that	  novice	  students	  provided	  naïve	  and	  fragmented	  elaborations	  of	  concepts	  using	  mostly	  everyday	  language.	  In	  addition,	  there	  was	  hardly	  any	  shared	  knowledge	  within	  their	  group	  (i.e.,	  individual	  knowledge	  about	  legal	  concepts	  differed	  enormously).	  Advanced	  students	  had	  more	  correct	  conceptual	  knowledge,	  used	  fewer	  daily	  examples,	  and	  used	  more	  formal	  legal	  language	  than	  novices,	  but	  they	  did	  not	  yet	  show	  much	  shared	  knowledge	  either.	  	  
Information	  sources	  	  In	  solving	  legal	  problems,	  practitioners	  have	  to	  rely	  on	  information	  sources	  such	  as	  databases	  containing	  jurisprudence,	  or	  codes	  and	  statutes	  (Williams,	  1992),	  because	  every	  case	  judgment	  should	  be	  defined	  precisely	  (i.e.,	  based	  on	  books	  of	  reference)	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  the	  judgment	  can	  be	  inferred	  exactly	  by	  others	  engaged	  in	  the	  legal	  process	  (Sullivan	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  Existing	  jurisprudence,	  the	  exact	  meaning	  of	  rules,	  and	  exceptions	  on	  rules	  can	  be	  looked	  up	  at	  any	  time	  in	  order	  to	  check	  or	  substantiate	  argumentation.	  However,	  next	  to	  knowledge	  of	  how	  these	  information	  sources	  are	  organized,	  conceptual	  knowledge	  is	  also	  necessary	  to	  make	  effective	  use	  of	  these	  information	  sources	  (Williams,	  1992),	  that	  is,	  to	  find	  the	  right	  rules	  or	  jurisprudence,	  understand	  this	  information,	  and	  link	  it	  to	  the	  case.	  	  Legal	  reasoning	  	  In	  problem	  solving,	  including	  solving	  legal	  cases,	  a	  number	  of	  general	  problem-­‐solving	  phases	  can	  be	  distinguished	  (cf.,	  Veenman	  &	  Elshout,	  1995).	  Orientation	  on	  the	  problem/	  case	  (i.e.,	  framing	  the	  problem),	  planning	  (e.g.,	  what	  steps,	  and	  in	  which	  order,	  should	  I	  take	  to	  solve	  the	  problem?),	  executing	  (e.g.,	  elaborating	  on	  a	  problem/case	  and	  drawing	  conclusions),	  monitoring	  the	  problem	  solving	  process	  (i.e.,	  in-­‐between	  evaluations,	  e.g.,	  am	  I	  still	  on	  the	  right	  track,	  on	  time?),	  and	  finally	  evaluating	  the	  entire	  process	  and	  the	  final	  product	  (e.g.,	  how	  did	  I	  do	  overall?).	  Orientation,	  planning,	  monitoring	  and	  evaluating	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  regulation	  phases	  whereas	  the	  executing	  phase	  consists	  of	  elaborating	  on	  the	  problem	  and	  drawing	  conclusions.	  There	  is	  no	  fixed	  order	  through	  these	  phases,	  and	  phases	  can	  be	  revisited.	  Expertise	  seems	  to	  influence	  the	  amount	  and	  duration	  of	  engagement	  in	  these	  general	  processes.	  In	  law	  for	  example,	  Lundeberg	  (1987),	  compared	  novices’	  (i.e.,	  non-­‐lawyers)	  and	  experts’	  approaches	  of	  case	  reading.	  During	  case	  reading,	  more	  experts	  than	  novices	  used	  general	  strategies;	  they	  put	  the	  case	  into	  context,	  made	  an	  overview,	  reread,	  underlined,	  synthesized	  and	  evaluated	  information	  from	  the	  case.	  Oates	  (2006)	  also	  showed	  that	  during	  case	  reading	  a	  law	  professor	  summarized	  and	  evaluated	  information	  from	  the	  case	  more	  often	  than	  law	  students	  did.	  In	  legal	  reasoning,	  the	  execution	  phase	  consists	  mainly	  of	  elaborating	  arguments	  and	  drawing	  conclusions	  on	  claims	  regarding	  applicability	  of	  rules.	  According	  to	  Toulmin’s	  model	  of	  argument,	  elaborating	  arguments	  and	  drawing	  conclusions	  can	  be	  subdivided	  into	  six	  different	  steps:	  (1)	  grounds,	  (2)	  warrants,	  (3)	  backings,	  (4)	  rebuttals,	  (5)	  qualifiers,	  and	  (6)	  conclusions	  (Toulmin	  et	  al.,	  1984;	  see	  also	  Vandevelde,	  1996).	  For	  instance,	  in	  solving	  a	  legal	  case,	  a	  lawyer	  must	  first	  distinguish	  and	  extract	  the	  legally	  relevant	  facts	  (grounds)	  from	  the	  case	  information.	  Based	  on	  the	  relevant	  facts,	  applicable	  sources	  of	  law	  referred	  to	  as	  warrants	  (e.g.,	  rules	  of	  law	  and	  statutes)	  have	  to	  be	  identified,	  along	  with	  possible	  additional	  information	  like	  a	  reference	  to	  generally	  accepted	  knowledge,	  norms	  or	  jurisprudence,	  which	  can	  strengthen	  the	  warrant	  (i.e.,	  backings).	  These	  warrants	  and	  backings	  have	  to	  
be	  compared	  to	  the	  grounds	  to	  test	  whether	  rules	  are	  indeed	  applicable	  to	  these	  facts.	  Applicable	  rules	  of	  law	  have	  to	  be	  placed	  in	  a	  specific	  sequence	  in	  which	  the	  more	  specific	  rules	  will	  be	  tested	  after	  the	  more	  general	  rules	  have	  proven	  valid.	  Rebuttals	  are	  information	  elements	  from	  the	  case	  that	  require	  the	  application	  of	  exceptions	  on	  rules,	  and	  the	  qualifier	  reflects	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  legally	  correct	  conclusion	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  available	  grounds,	  warrants,	  backings	  and	  rebuttals.	  The	  final	  conclusion	  (i.e.,	  judgment)	  should	  be	  drawn,	  consisting	  of	  that	  which,	  based	  on	  available	  information,	  can	  be	  asserted.	  	  The	  present	  study	  	  The	  present	  study	  addresses	  how	  the	  availability	  of	  conceptual	  knowledge	  and	  information	  sources	  affects	  the	  process	  and	  quality	  of	  legal	  reasoning	  in	  the	  Civil	  Law	  (European-­‐Continental)	  system.	  The	  first	  question	  investigated	  here	  concerns	  the	  role	  of	  conceptual	  knowledge	  in	  legal	  reasoning.	  In	  order	  to	  study	  this	  question,	  we	  compared	  novices	  and	  advanced	  students	  with	  experts	  in	  an	  ‘unsupported’	  condition,	  in	  which	  they	  could	  not	  rely	  on	  information	  sources.	  Because	  in	  practice,	  legal	  professionals	  can	  always	  rely	  on	  information	  sources	  when	  working	  on	  cases,	  it	  is	  unclear	  to	  what	  extent	  they	  depend	  on	  these	  sources,	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  their	  acquired	  conceptual	  knowledge	  (i.e.,	  their	  expertise)	  can	  help	  them	  solve	  a	  case.	  It	  is	  hypothesized	  that:	  (1)	  students	  (novice	  and	  advanced)	  will	  be	  less	  accurate	  in	  solving	  a	  legal	  case	  than	  experts,	  and	  (2)	  because	  students	  have	  much	  less	  conceptual	  knowledge	  than	  experts,	  we	  expect	  differences	  in	  the	  problem-­‐solving	  process,	  with	  students	  showing	  less	  regulation	  and	  execution	  activities	  than	  experts.	  Probably	  because	  legal	  professionals	  rely	  on	  information	  sources	  when	  solving	  cases,	  the	  preferred	  method	  of	  instruction	  is	  having	  students	  solve	  cases	  with	  the	  aid	  of	  such	  sources.	  However,	  we	  argue	  that	  even	  under	  such	  ‘natural’	  conditions	  where	  students	  can	  make	  use	  of	  information	  sources,	  it	  is	  questionable	  whether	  this	  can	  help	  novice	  students,	  because	  adequate	  use	  of	  these	  sources	  would	  also	  rely	  on	  conceptual	  knowledge,	  as	  well	  as	  on	  knowledge	  of	  how	  the	  source	  is	  organized.	  Lack	  of	  such	  knowledge	  would	  probably	  result	  in	  ineffective	  search	  strategies	  when	  using	  the	  information	  source,	  which	  imposes	  a	  heavy	  additional	  load	  on	  working	  memory	  (cf.	  Sweller	  et	  al.,	  1998),	  thereby	  reducing	  the	  cognitive	  resources	  available	  for	  reasoning	  about	  the	  case.	  That	  is,	  when	  a	  student	  does	  not	  know	  exactly	  what	  (s)he	  is	  looking	  for,	  or	  does	  not	  know	  where	  to	  look	  for	  that	  information,	  the	  search	  space	  becomes	  very	  large	  and	  students	  may	  get	  ‘lost’	  in	  the	  search	  process	  itself.	  Consequently,	  given	  the	  limited	  capacity	  of	  quantity	  and	  duration	  of	  working	  memory	  (see	  Miller,	  1956;	  Cowan,	  2001),	  it	  will	  be	  difficult	  if	  not	  impossible	  tokeep	  the	  case	  details	  active	  in	  working	  memory,	  let	  alone	  linking	  possibly	  relevant	  information	  to	  the	  case.	  Therefore,	  the	  second	  question	  addressed	  here	  is	  whether	  novice	  students	  can	  benefit	  from	  the	  availability	  of	  an	  information	  source	  (in	  this	  study:	  the	  civil	  code).	  It	  is	  hypothesized	  that:	  (3a)	  novices	  allowed	  to	  use	  the	  civil	  code	  would	  not	  be	  more	  accurate	  in	  solving	  the	  legal	  case	  compared	  to	  novices	  who	  are	  not	  allowed	  to	  use	  it,	  whereas	  (3b)	  advanced	  students	  who	  are	  allowed	  to	  use	  the	  civil	  code,	  would	  be	  more	  accurate	  in	  solving	  the	  legal	  case	  than	  advanced	  students	  who	  are	  not	  allowed	  to	  use	  this	  source,	  because	  contrary	  to	  novices,	  they	  have	  sufficient	  (conceptual)	  knowledge	  to	  find	  and	  benefit	  from	  the	  information	  in	  the	  civil	  code	  (i.e.,	  they	  can	  understand	  and	  apply	  the	  information).	  Furthermore,	  (4)	  both	  novices	  and	  advanced	  students’	  general	  problem-­‐solving	  process	  will	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  use	  of	  an	  external	  source.	  Those	  who	  have	  more	  information	  at	  their	  disposal,	  will	  show	  more	  regulation	  and	  execution	  activities	  than	  those	  advanced	  and	  novice	  students	  who	  were	  not	  allowed	  to	  use	  the	  civil	  code.	  	  
Method	  	  Participants	  	  Forty-­‐eight	  students	  enrolled	  in	  civil	  law	  courses	  (Dutch	  specification:	  ‘privaatrecht’)	  and	  12	  staff	  members	  specialized	  in	  civil	  law	  participated	  in	  this	  study.	  Students	  were	  24	  first	  year	  students	  (novices)	  who	  recently	  completed	  an	  introductory	  course	  on	  civil	  law,	  and	  24	  third-­‐year	  students	  (advanced	  students)	  who	  additionally	  completed	  two	  more	  extensive	  civil	  law	  courses.	  The	  12	  members	  of	  the	  faculty	  of	  law	  had	  on	  average	  5.9	  years	  of	  experience	  with	  civil	  law	  after	  obtaining	  their	  PhD	  (experts).	  Students	  received	  a	  financial	  compensation	  of	  €10	  (ca.	  $14	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing)	  for	  their	  participation,	  and	  experts	  received	  a	  present	  of	  about	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  money,	  but	  were	  not	  informed	  about	  this	  in	  advance.	  	  Design	  	  There	  are	  three	  expertise	  groups:	  novices,	  advanced	  students,	  and	  experts.	  The	  novice	  and	  advanced	  
students	  were	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  a	  condition	  in	  which	  they	  could	  or	  could	  not	  use	  an	  information	  source	  (i.e.,	  the	  civil	  code).	  This	  resulted	  in	  five	  conditions:	  novices	  without	  civil	  code	  (n	  =	  12),	  novices	  with	  civil	  code	  (n	  =	  12),	  advanced	  students	  without	  civil	  code	  (n	  =	  12),	  advanced	  students	  with	  civil	  code	  (n	  =	  12),	  and	  experts	  (without	  civil	  code;	  n	  =	  12).	  	  Materials	  	  
Case	  	  A	  Civil	  law	  case	  printed	  on	  A4	  paper.	  This	  case	  concerned	  law	  of	  obligations	  and	  described	  a	  conflict	  between	  two	  civilians	  (the	  plaintiff,	  Mr.	  S.,	  and	  the	  defendant,	  Mr.	  D.)	  about	  the	  ownership	  and	  the	  garaging	  of	  a	  sailing	  boat.	  Based	  on	  the	  context,	  five	  legal	  claims	  were	  described	  (i.e.,	  right	  of	  reclamation,	  right	  of	  retention,	  costs	  of	  garaging,	  finder’s	  reward,	  and	  legal	  costs;	  see	  Appendix	  A).	  	  
Civil	  code	  	  In	  the	  civil	  code	  (Klomp	  &	  Mak,	  2005)	  statutes	  and	  rules,	  applicable	  in	  civil	  procedures,	  are	  codified.	  	  
Think-­aloud	  instruction	  and	  recording	  	  Participants	  were	  instructed	  to	  argue	  on	  the	  case	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  defendant’s	  lawyer,	  and	  while	  doing	  so,	  to	  think	  aloud,	  that	  is,	  to	  verbalize	  everything	  that	  came	  to	  their	  mind	  without	  any	  restrictions	  (Ericsson	  &	  Simon,	  1993).	  Their	  verbalizations	  were	  directly	  recorded	  on	  a	  laptop	  computer	  with	  Audacity	  1.2.4b	  audio	  editor,	  using	  a	  microphone.	  	  Procedure	  	  The	  experiment	  was	  run	  in	  individual	  sessions.	  Participants	  were	  given	  a	  maximum	  time	  of	  30	  min	  to	  work	  on	  the	  case.	  First,	  they	  were	  instructed	  to	  read	  the	  case	  aloud	  for	  up	  to	  5	  min.	  After	  reading	  the	  case,	  participants	  were	  instructed	  to	  analyse	  the	  case	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  defendant’s	  lawyer,	  and	  to	  give	  an	  elaborate	  description	  of	  how	  they	  would	  solve	  the	  problem	  in	  the	  specific	  case.	  Students	  in	  the	  conditions	  with	  civil	  code	  received	  the	  additional	  instruction	  that	  they	  could	  use	  the	  civil	  code	  on	  their	  desk	  at	  any	  time.	  In	  case	  participants	  stopped	  thinking	  aloud,	  the	  experimenter	  prompted	  them	  after	  about	  5	  s	  by	  saying	  that	  they	  should	  continue	  to	  think	  aloud.	  The	  recorded	  verbalizations	  were	  transcribed	  after	  the	  experiment.	  	  Data	  analysis	  	  
Reasoning	  process	  	  The	  coding	  scheme	  used	  to	  analyse	  the	  think-­‐aloud	  protocols	  in	  terms	  of	  general	  problem	  solving	  processes	  was	  based	  on	  the	  one	  used	  in	  a	  pilot	  study	  by	  Nievelstein	  et	  al.	  (2005),	  and	  was	  further	  refined	  with	  a	  subset	  of	  protocols	  from	  the	  present	  study.	  The	  problem	  solving	  process	  was	  categorized	  by	  four	  main	  regulative	  categories,	  that	  is,	  Orientation,	  Planning,	  Monitoring,	  and	  Evaluating,	  and	  by	  two	  main	  executive	  categories,	  Elaborating	  and	  Concluding.	  Orientation	  was	  subdivided	  into	  problem	  orientation	  (e.g.,	  reading	  aloud,	  summarizing,	  perspective	  taking,	  labeling,	  making	  assumptions,	  and	  identifying	  knowledge	  gaps),	  and	  into	  activating	  domain	  knowledge	  (e.g.,	  using	  conceptual	  knowledge,	  using	  the	  civil	  code).	  Planning	  concerned	  remarks	  about	  the	  steps	  one	  would	  or	  should	  take	  to	  solve	  the	  problem.	  Monitoring	  concerned	  in-­‐between	  evaluations	  of	  the	  problem	  solving	  process,	  whereas	  evaluations	  about	  the	  final	  product	  fell	  in	  the	  category	  Evaluating.	  The	  categories	  Elaborating	  and	  Concluding	  comprised	  arguments	  or	  conclusions,	  respectively,	  with	  regard	  to	  one	  of	  the	  five	  claims	  mentioned	  in	  the	  case.	  The	  protocols	  were	  segmented	  and	  coded	  based	  on	  meaning,	  that	  is,	  parts	  of	  the	  protocol	  that	  could	  be	  assigned	  as	  a	  whole	  to	  one	  of	  the	  categories,	  were	  coded	  as	  one	  segment.	  Two	  raters	  independently	  scored	  25%	  of	  the	  protocols.	  The	  inter-­‐rater	  reliability	  was	  0.81	  (Cohen’s	  kappa).	  Because	  this	  inter-­‐rater	  reliability	  was	  high	  (0.70	  is	  considered	  sufficient;	  Van	  Someren	  et	  al.,	  1994)	  the	  remaining	  protocols	  were	  scored	  by	  one	  rater.	  Our	  analysis	  was	  based	  on	  the	  total	  number	  of	  codes	  per	  problem-­‐solving	  process	  category	  (i.e.,	  the	  frequencies).	  The	  process	  of	  segmentation	  and	  coding	  was	  done	  with	  the	  software	  program	  Multiple	  Episode	  Protocol	  Analysis	  (MEPA;	  Erkens,	  2002).	  	  
Accuracy	  of	  reasoning	  	  	  
To	  investigate	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  argumentations	  (i.e.,	  the	  parts	  of	  the	  protocol	  that	  were	  coded	  as	  belonging	  to	  the	  executive	  process	  categories	  of	  ‘‘elaborating’’	  and	  ‘‘concluding’’),	  a	  coding	  scheme	  based	  on	  Toulmin’s	  Model	  of	  Argument	  (Toulmin	  et	  al.,	  1984)	  was	  used,	  which	  was	  also	  tested	  in	  the	  pilot	  study	  by	  Nievelstein	  et	  al.	  (2005).	  This	  coding	  scheme	  consisted	  of	  five	  out	  of	  the	  six	  categories:	  grounds,	  warrants,	  backings,	  rebuttals	  and	  the	  final	  conclusion.	  We	  decided	  to	  exclude	  the	  qualifying	  category	  because	  a	  qualified	  would	  reflect	  the	  participants’	  subjective	  certainty	  of	  the	  accuracy	  of	  the	  answer,	  which	  is	  more	  of	  a	  regulative	  statement,	  and	  would	  therefore	  fall	  in	  the	  Monitoring	  or	  Evaluation	  categories.	  Per	  claim	  mentioned	  in	  the	  case,	  elaborations	  and	  conclusions	  given	  by	  the	  participants	  were	  expounded	  in	  Toulmins’	  model	  of	  argument	  to	  reveal	  completeness	  of	  reasoning.	  The	  relevant	  judicial	  case	  information	  regarding	  to	  one	  of	  the	  five	  claims	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  ground	  on	  which	  arguments	  and/or	  conclusions	  could	  be	  based.	  First	  the	  grounds	  described	  in	  the	  case	  (i.e.,	  maximum	  five)	  identified	  by	  participants,	  were	  counted.	  Parts	  of	  the	  protocol	  that	  belonged	  to	  the	  categories	  of	  elaborating	  (i.e.,	  argumentation)	  and	  concluding	  were	  coded	  per	  legal	  claim	  as	  being	  either	  a	  warrant,	  conclusion,	  backing	  or	  rebuttal.	  The	  accuracy	  of	  those	  warrants,	  conclusions,	  backings	  and	  rebuttals	  was	  rated	  according	  to	  an	  answer	  model	  (cf.	  those	  used	  by	  teachers	  to	  grade	  case	  elaborations	  solutions	  on	  tests	  or	  exams)	  that	  contained	  detailed	  elaborations	  of	  the	  five	  claims	  based	  on	  the	  descriptions	  of	  the	  five	  claims	  in	  the	  Dutch	  civil	  code.	  For	  every	  correct	  warrant,	  conclusion,	  backing	  and	  rebuttal,	  consistent	  with	  the	  answer	  model,	  1	  point	  was	  scored.	  In	  total	  24	  points	  could	  be	  	  assigned.	  	  
Results	  and	  discussion	  	  The	  means	  and	  standard	  deviations	  regarding	  the	  accuracy	  of	  reasoning,	  are	  shown	  in	  Table	  1,	  those	  regarding	  the	  reasoning	  process	  are	  shown	  in	  Table	  2.	  	  	  Table	  1	  The	  means	  and	  standard	  deviations	  of	  reasoning	  accuracy	  scores	  of	  novice	  students,	  advanced	  students	  and	  experts	  	  	   Novice	  students	  	   Advanced	  students	  	   Experts	  	   No	  code	  	  	  	  	  	   Code	  	   No	  code	   Code	   	  	   M	   SD	  	   M	   SD	  	   M	   SD	  	   M	   SD	  	   M	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   SD	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Correct	  total	  warrants	  	   2.42	  	  	  	   1.62	  	  	  	  	   1.83	  	  	  	   1.12	  	  	  	  	  	   1.42	  	  	  	   1.00	  	  	  	   2.92	  	  	   1.44	  	  	  	   3.42	  	  	   1.62	  Correct	  total	  backings	  	   0.50	  	  	  	   0.80	  	  	  	  	   1.50	  	  	  	   1.73	  	   0.50	  	  	  	   0.79	  	  	  	   1.00	  	  	   1.71	  	   1.67	  	  	   1.37	  Correct	  total	  rebuttals	  	   0.17	  	  	  	   0.39	  	  	  	   0.08	  	  	  	   0.30	  	   0.08	  	  	  	   0.29	  	  	  	   0.42	  	  	   0.79	  	   0.33	  	  	   0.49	  Correct	  total	  conclusions	  	   1.50	  	  	  	   1.62	  	  	  	  	   2.17	  	  	  	   0.72	  	   1.25	  	  	  	   1.36	  	  	  	   2.33	  	  	   1.23	  	   2.33	  	  	   1.37	  Correct	  total	  elements	  	   4.58	  	  	  	   3.60	  	  	  	  	   5.58	  	  	  	   2.99	  	   3.25	  	  	  	   2.53	  	  	  	   6.67	  	  	   4.66	  	   7.75	  	  	   3.75	  	  	  Table	  2	  Means	  and	  standard	  deviations	  of	  reasoning	  process	  scores	  of	  novice	  students,	  advanced	  students	  and	  experts	  	   Novice	  students	  	   Advanced	  students	  	   Experts	  	   No	  code	   Code	  	   No	  code	   Code	   	  	   M	   SD	   M	   SD	  	   M	   SD	   M	   SD	  	   M	   SD	  Mean	  total	  protocol	  elements	  	   33.00	  	  	   18.17	  	  	  	   50.83	  	  	   21.05	   30.67	   10.65	   46.25	  	   25.63	   36.92	  	   15.06	  Total	  number	  regulative	  phases	  	   14.75	  	  	  	  	   8.76	  	  	  	   34.25	   13.31	  	   17.42	  	  	  	   9.47	  	  	  	   28.67	   23.90	   20.75	  	   11.52	  Total	  number	  executive	  phases	  	   18.25	  	  	   11.54	   16.58	  	  	  	   11.41	  	  	   13.25	  	  	  	   4.69	   17.58	   10.98	   16.17	  	  	  	   9.24	  Orientation	  (reg)	  	   11.08	  	  	  	  	   8.63	  	  	  	   24.25	   10.10	  	  	   11.42	  	  	  	  	   6.75	  	   20.33	   16.99	   15.33	  	  	  	   8.91	  Monitoring	  (reg)	  	   0.92	  	  	  	   0.52	  	  	  	  	  	   4.33	  	   3.23	  	  	  	  	  	   0.92	  	  	  	  	   1.17	  	   3.33	  	   3.47	   2.25	  	  	  	   2.63	  
Planning	  (reg)	  	   	  	  	  2.08	  	  	  	   1.38	  	  	  	  	  	   3.92	  	  	   1.78	  	  	  	  	  	   3.25	  	  	  	  	  	   2.53	  	   3.33	  	  	   3.31	   1.92	  	  	  	   2.02	  Evaluation	  (reg)	  	   	  	  	  0.67	  	  	  	  	   0.49	  	  	  	  	   1.75	  	  	   2.49	  	  	  	  	  	   1.83	  	  	  	  	  	   1.34	  	   1.67	  	   1.72	   1.25	  	  	  	   1.42	  Elaboration	  (exe)	   11.25	  	  	  	  	  	   6.90	  	   10.25	  	  	   8.60	  	  	  	  	  	   8.42	  	  	  	  	  	   3.66	   11.33	  	  	   7.38	   9.58	  	  	  	   5.47	  Concluding	  (exe)	  	   	  	  7.00	  	  	  	  	  	   4.99	  	  	  	   	  	  6.33	  	   3.55	  	  	  	  	  	   4.83	   1.70	  	   6.25	  	   4.00	   6.58	  	  	  	   4.44	  	  Effects	  of	  availability	  of	  conceptual	  knowledge	  	  
Accuracy	  of	  reasoning	  	  In	  line	  with	  our	  first	  hypothesis,	  a	  planned	  contrast	  showed	  that	  students	  were	  less	  accurate	  than	  experts,	  that	  is,	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  correct	  warrants,	  backings,	  rebuttals	  and	  conclusions	  for	  the	  five	  different	  claims	  in	  the	  case,	  was	  significantly	  lower	  for	  students	  (M	  =	  3.92,	  SD	  =	  3.13),	  than	  for	  experts	  (M	  =	  7.75,	  SD	  =	  3.75),	  t(55)	  =	  3.02,	  p<0.05,	  d	  =	  1.11.	  The	  following	  excerpts	  from	  a	  student’s	  and	  an	  expert’s	  protocol	  illustrate	  their	  elaborations	  on	  the	  claim	  ‘right	  of	  retention’.	  Student:	  ‘Well	  the	  right	  of	  retention	  I	  think	  that	  it	  never	  existed	  at	  all.	  I	  do	  not	  know	  exactly	  why	  because	  I	  do	  not	  exactly	  know	  what	  the	  right	  of	  retention	  means…’	  Expert:	  ‘Mr	  D	  is	  still	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  sailing	  boat,	  Mr	  S	  cannot	  claim	  that	  he	  is	  the	  owner	  because	  Mr	  S	  took	  charge	  of	  the	  sailing	  boat	  so	  he	  did	  not	  become	  the	  owner.	  Mr	  S	  should	  have	  required	  an	  ownership	  certificate	  of	  the	  sailing	  boat.	  Well,	  let’s	  see.	  The	  right	  of	  retention	  existed	  until	  the	  police	  took	  possession	  of	  the	  sailing	  boat…’	  However,	  experts’	  mean	  score	  was	  not	  very	  high:	  on	  average,	  they	  scored	  only	  7.25	  out	  of	  24	  points.	  One	  might	  suppose	  that	  this	  score	  reflects	  that	  experts	  might	  be	  able	  to	  draw	  adequate	  conclusions,	  but	  might	  depend	  on	  a	  lawbook	  to	  provide	  the	  exact	  argumentation,	  but	  that	  was	  not	  the	  case,	  because	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  accuracy	  scores	  shows	  that	  experts’	  mentioned	  only	  47%	  of	  the	  correct	  conclusions,	  and	  30%	  of	  the	  of	  the	  correct	  argumentation	  elements	  according	  to	  the	  coding	  scheme	  (i.e.,	  warrants,	  backings,	  rebuttals).	  Therefore,	  this	  finding	  suggests	  that	  experts	  do	  not	  only	  rely	  on	  the	  use	  of	  information	  sources	  for	  substantiating	  their	  conclusions,	  but	  also	  for	  drawing	  them.	  This	  is	  probably	  because	  law	  professionals	  routinely	  use	  information	  sources	  when	  they	  are	  working	  on	  cases	  in	  everyday	  practice	  (Williams,	  1992).	  Without	  having	  access	  to	  those	  sources,	  they	  experience	  difficulties	  applying	  the	  formal	  law	  properly.	  A	  quote	  from	  an	  expert	  protocol	  can	  illustrate	  this.	  ‘Well,	  this	  specific	  problem	  is	  more	  or	  less	  similar	  to	  a	  decree	  I	  know…Hmm,	  the	  easiest	  way	  to	  solve	  this	  case	  is	  to	  search	  for	  this	  decree…but	  that	  is	  not	  possible	  now…’	  Another	  expert	  mentioned:	  ‘First	  I	  should	  search	  in	  the	  code	  what	  specifically	  is	  said	  about	  ownership	  and	  depository…’	  	  
Reasoning	  process	  	  Contrary	  to	  our	  expectations,	  a	  planned	  contrast	  showed	  no	  significant	  differences	  between	  students	  and	  experts	  on	  regulation	  activities:	  t(55)	  =	  -­‐0.91,	  ns,	  and	  execution	  activities:	  t(55)	  =	  -­‐0.12,	  ns.	  The	  fact	  that	  experts	  and	  students	  did	  not	  differ	  significantly	  with	  regard	  to	  their	  problem	  solving	  processes	  (as	  the	  studies	  of	  Lundeberg	  ,1987,	  and	  Oates,	  2006,	  would	  suggest),	  might	  also	  be	  a	  consequence	  of	  not	  being	  allowed	  to	  use	  information	  sources,	  which	  may	  have	  interfered	  with	  their	  usual	  approach	  to	  problem	  solving.	  	  Effects	  of	  availability	  of	  an	  information	  source	  on	  students’	  reasoning	  	  
Accuracy	  of	  reasoning	  	  In	  line	  with	  our	  hypothesis,	  planned	  contrasts	  showed	  that	  advanced	  students	  who	  could	  use	  the	  civil	  code	  were	  significantly	  more	  accurate	  than	  advanced	  students	  who	  could	  not	  use	  the	  civil	  code,	  t(55)	  =	  -­‐2.33,	  p<0.05,	  d	  =	  0.13,	  whereas	  no	  significant	  difference	  was	  found	  for	  novices	  t(55)	  =	  -­‐0.74,	  ns.	  We	  hypothesized	  that	  this	  would	  happen,	  because	  novices	  could	  not	  profit	  from	  the	  civil	  code	  since	  their	  lack	  of	  conceptual	  knowledge	  influences	  not	  only	  their	  interpretation	  of	  the	  case,	  but	  also	  their	  ability	  to	  use	  the	  civil	  code	  effectively.	  It	  could	  also	  be	  that	  novices	  lack	  knowledge	  of	  how	  the	  civil	  code	  is	  organized	  (e.g.,	  were	  to	  find	  the	  right	  articles?,	  what	  does	  the	  numeration	  mean?	  etc.),	  or	  it	  might	  be	  a	  combination	  of	  both.	  The	  following	  examples	  of	  protocol	  excerpts	  illustrate	  nicely	  this.	  An	  example	  from	  an	  advanced	  student,	  who	  was	  not	  allowed	  to	  use	  the	  civil	  code,	  illustrates	  that	  without	  using	  the	  code,	  difficulties	  arise	  in	  reasoning	  about	  the	  right	  of	  reclamation	  ‘The	  right	  of	  reclamation…,	  well	  I	  do	  not	  know	  by	  heart	  what	  it	  exactly	  means…if	  I	  had	  the	  possibility	  to	  search	  in	  the	  civil	  code	  I	  would	  first	  look	  at	  the	  period	  of	  limitation….’	  The	  following	  example	  from	  a	  novice	  who	  could	  not	  use	  the	  civil	  code,	  seems	  similar,	  except	  that	  the	  advanced	  student	  is	  more	  specific	  in	  what	  
(s)he	  would	  look	  for	  in	  the	  code:	  ‘Oh	  no,	  I	  do	  not	  know	  what	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  right	  of	  retention	  is…	  I	  do	  not	  know	  what	  ownership	  exactly	  encompasses…I	  actually	  need	  a	  civil	  code	  to	  search	  for	  it…’.	  So	  both	  novice	  and	  advanced	  students	  indicate	  they	  need	  the	  code.	  However,	  when	  the	  civil	  code	  is	  available,	  the	  following	  example	  illustrates	  what	  happens	  when	  a	  novice	  starts	  searching	  for	  information,	  in	  this	  case	  also	  concerning	  the	  right	  of	  retention:	  ‘The	  right	  of	  retention,	  hmm,	  I	  will	  look	  immediately	  at	  article	  8.	  945,	  hmm	  lets	  see	  8.	  945,	  I	  will	  go	  back..	  hmm	  the	  code	  jumps	  from	  article	  910	  directly	  to	  7,	  I	  first	  see	  article	  908	  and	  then	  7.1	  hmmm	  ok,	  that	  is	  not	  what	  I	  am	  looking	  for…’	  This	  novice	  seems	  to	  experience	  problems	  finding	  the	  right	  information;	  (s)he	  does	  not	  know	  exactly	  what	  information	  (s)he	  is	  looking	  for	  and	  where	  it	  can	  be	  found.	  This	  is	  in	  marked	  contrast	  to	  the	  following	  excerpt	  from	  the	  protocol	  of	  an	  advanced	  student	  who	  could	  use	  the	  civil	  code,	  which	  illustrates	  that	  (s)he	  could	  not	  only	  find	  the	  right	  information	  regarding	  the	  right	  of	  reclamation,	  but	  could	  also	  link	  the	  information	  from	  the	  civil	  code	  to	  the	  information	  in	  the	  case	  regarding	  the	  claim:	  ‘In	  this	  case	  Mr	  D	  has	  the	  right	  of	  reclamation	  because	  the	  civil	  code	  says:	  ‘‘that	  the	  owner	  of	  an	  object	  has	  the	  authority	  to	  claim	  the	  object	  from	  every	  person	  who	  keeps	  the	  object	  without	  permission’’…’	  	  
Reasoning	  process	  	  	  Furthermore	  it	  was	  found	  that	  novices	  who	  could	  use	  the	  civil	  code	  made	  significantly	  more	  regulative	  comments,	  t(55)	  =	  -­‐3.30,	  p<0.05,	  d	  =	  1.73	  than	  novices	  who	  could	  not	  use	  the	  civil	  code.	  This	  finding	  is	  probably	  due	  to	  the	  (ineffective)	  search	  processes	  in	  the	  civil	  code,	  and	  reflects	  ‘‘negative’’	  remarks	  concerning	  regulation	  (e.g.,	  ‘I	  cannot	  find	  what	  I	  am	  looking	  for’).	  The	  following	  excerpt	  from	  a	  novice	  with	  the	  civil	  code	  illustrates	  that	  using	  the	  code	  leads	  to	  regulation	  even	  if	  the	  student	  has	  difficulties	  understanding	  the	  formal	  information:	  ‘First	  I	  will	  search	  in	  the	  civil	  code	  what	  specifically	  is	  said	  about	  the	  right	  of	  retention,	  lets	  see	  hmm,	  ok,	  here	  it	  is	  said:	  ‘‘The	  right	  of	  retention	  means	  the	  authority,	  indicated	  by	  law,	  the	  creditor	  has	  to	  postpone	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  obligation	  until	  the	  claim	  is	  paid	  by	  the	  debtor’’…well	  ok	  hmm,	  what	  does	  this	  all	  mean…?’	  Contrary	  to	  our	  expectations,	  there	  were	  no	  significant	  differences	  between	  advanced	  students	  who	  could	  and	  could	  not	  use	  the	  civil	  code	  both	  on	  regulation	  activities:	  t(55)	  =	  -­‐1.90,	  ns,	  and	  execution	  activities:	  t(55)	  =	  -­‐1.07,	  ns.	  So	  even	  though	  advanced	  students	  were	  able	  to	  benefit	  from	  the	  availability	  of	  the	  civil	  code	  in	  terms	  of	  accuracy,	  this	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  affect	  the	  amount	  of	  engagement	  in	  general	  reasoning	  processes,	  although	  it	  must	  have	  influenced	  the	  content.	  	  
Conclusions	  and	  implications	  	  This	  study	  investigated	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  availability	  of	  conceptual	  knowledge	  on	  legal	  reasoning	  by	  comparing	  the	  accuracy	  and	  process	  of	  reasoning	  of	  students	  and	  experts	  when	  they	  could	  only	  rely	  on	  their	  knowledge.	  It	  was	  found	  that	  experts	  performed	  better	  than	  students,	  but	  that	  their	  performance	  was	  still	  rather	  low.	  This	  study	  provides	  an	  indication	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  experts	  depend	  on	  information	  sources	  when	  reasoning	  about	  cases.	  They	  do	  not	  only	  seem	  to	  need	  such	  sources	  for	  substantiating	  conclusions,	  but	  also	  for	  working	  towards	  conclusions.	  Next	  we	  investigated	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  availability	  of	  the	  civil	  code	  on	  the	  accuracy	  and	  process	  of	  novice	  and	  advanced	  students’	  legal	  reasoning.	  As	  we	  hypothesized,	  the	  availability	  of	  the	  civil	  code	  improved	  legal	  reasoning	  for	  advanced	  students,	  but	  not	  for	  novice	  students.	  Lack	  of	  conceptual	  knowledge	  and	  lack	  of	  knowledge	  of	  how	  information	  sources	  are	  organized,	  both	  by	  themselves	  or	  in	  combination,	  indeed	  seemed	  to	  lead	  to	  ineffective	  search	  processes	  when	  using	  the	  information	  sources.	  Such	  processes	  impose	  a	  high	  additional	  and	  ineffective	  (i.e.,	  extraneous)	  load	  on	  working	  memory,	  that	  is,	  this	  load	  is	  not	  imposed	  by	  processes	  that	  contribute	  to	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  task	  performance	  (for	  a	  discussion	  of	  cognitive	  load	  theory,	  see	  Sweller	  et	  al.,	  1998;	  Van	  Merriënboer	  &	  Sweller,	  2005).	  The	  findings	  strongly	  suggest	  that	  current	  instructional	  methods	  for	  novice	  students	  in	  law	  school	  are	  suboptimal.	  Law	  education	  relies	  heavily	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  students	  learn	  to	  reason	  about—and	  to	  solve—cases	  by	  engaging	  in	  solving	  cases	  (with	  the	  aid	  of	  external	  sources)	  from	  very	  early	  on	  in	  their	  trajectory.	  However,	  the	  results	  from	  the	  current	  study	  suggest	  that	  novices	  may	  learn	  very	  little	  from	  this	  form	  of	  instruction,	  that	  is,	  their	  performance	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  improve	  from	  being	  allowed	  to	  use	  the	  civil	  code	  compared	  to	  not	  having	  an	  information	  source	  available	  at	  all.	  Therefore,	  novice	  law	  students	  might	  need	  different	  forms	  of	  instruction,	  or	  more	  instructional	  guidance	  to	  help	  them	  learn	  to	  solve	  cases	  more	  effectively.	  Research	  on	  scaffolding	  or	  fading	  instructional	  guidance	  has	  shown	  that	  providing	  high	  levels	  of	  support	  initially	  (e.g.,	  by	  reducing	  the	  amount	  of	  search	  required	  through	  the	  use	  of	  worked	  examples	  or	  by	  other	  means)	  and	  then	  slowly	  fading	  this	  out	  with	  increasing	  student	  expertise/knowledge,	  makes	  the	  learning	  process	  more	  effective	  and	  efficient	  (see	  e.g.,	  Kalyuga	  et	  al.,	  2003;	  McNeill	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  Renkl	  &	  Atkinson,	  2003;	  Van	  Gog	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  Future	  studies	  should	  investigate	  whether	  forms	  of	  instructional	  guidance,	  such	  as	  scaffolding	  conceptual	  knowledge,	  
or	  diminishing	  the	  additional	  cognitive	  load	  imposed	  by	  the	  search	  process	  in	  the	  civil	  code	  (e.g.,	  by	  giving	  students	  not	  a	  full,	  but	  a	  condensed	  version	  containing	  only	  relevant	  information),	  are	  more	  effective	  and	  efficient	  for	  novices	  than	  the	  ‘‘traditional’’	  method	  of	  instruction.	  Concerning	  scaffolding	  of	  conceptual	  knowledge,	  an	  important	  question	  is	  what	  the	  most	  optimal	  technique	  would	  be,	  and	  the	  answer	  likely	  depends	  on	  the	  type	  of	  concepts	  as	  well.	  It	  may	  be	  that	  providing	  the	  students	  with	  the	  definition	  of	  concepts	  suffices,	  however,	  the	  meaning	  of	  some	  legal	  concepts	  may	  vary	  according	  to	  the	  context	  (Lindahl,	  2003;	  see	  also	  Nievelstein	  et	  al.	  in	  press),	  and	  learning	  these	  may	  therefore	  depend	  on	  repeated	  encounters	  with	  the	  concept	  in	  several	  different	  contexts	  and	  cases.	  In	  this	  case	  one	  might	  consider	  annotating	  concept	  definitions	  in	  different	  cases	  and	  requiring	  students	  to	  make	  comparisons	  between	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  concepts	  in	  the	  cases.	  	  It	  is	  impossible	  to	  imagine	  the	  law	  profession	  without	  the	  availability	  of	  external	  information	  sources,	  yet	  this	  study	  showed	  that	  the	  influence	  of	  these	  sources—and	  learning	  how	  to	  use	  them—on	  legal	  reasoning	  should	  not	  be	  underestimated.	  There	  is	  a	  difference	  between	  the	  way	  the	  profession	  is	  practiced	  and	  the	  way	  novices	  should	  be	  taught	  to	  become	  a	  practitioner	  in	  the	  domain.	  Even	  though	  the	  approaches	  to	  solving	  legal	  cases	  differ	  in	  Common	  Law	  and	  Civil	  Law,	  the	  current	  findings	  may	  also	  apply	  to	  the	  Common	  Law	  system.	  Conceptual	  knowledge	  plays	  an	  equally	  important	  role	  in	  Common	  Law,	  and	  even	  though	  the	  information	  sources	  used	  may	  differ	  (e.g.,	  documented	  jurisprudence)	  the	  ineffectiveness	  of	  search	  processes	  when	  using	  these	  sources	  may	  not	  be	  that	  different.	  However,	  it	  would	  be	  interesting	  to	  test	  this	  in	  future	  studies.	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Appendix	  A—Civil	  law	  case	  	  ‘The	  sailing	  boat’	  	  Mister	  Schip	  (S)	  exploits	  a	  boat	  garaging.	  In	  a	  harbor	  lies	  the	  pilot	  of	  mister	  Schip	  of	  which	  he	  is	  the	  owner.	  March	  1999,	  a	  wooden	  sailing	  boat	  (from	  now:	  the	  boat)	  is	  stolen	  from	  mister	  Duinstra	  (D).	  Mister	  D	  reported	  this	  theft	  by	  the	  police.	  September	  2000,	  an	  unknown	  person	  requested	  mister	  S	  to	  store	  a	  boat	  in	  his	  pilot;	  S	  accepted	  and	  garaged	  the	  boat	  in	  his	  garaging.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  June,	  mister	  D	  sees	  by	  accident	  that	  his	  boat	  is	  stored	  in	  mister	  S’	  garaging,	  and	  he	  let	  S	  know	  that	  he	  is	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  boat.	  D	  requests	  S	  to	  hand	  over	  the	  boat.	  S	  is	  willing	  to	  do	  this	  on	  condition	  that	  D	  pays	  the	  garaging	  costs.	  D	  refused.	  July,	  25th	  2004,	  D	  reported	  his	  discovery	  by	  the	  police.	  August	  the	  1st	  2004,	  the	  police	  attached	  the	  boat	  and	  mister	  S	  is	  questioned	  as	  suspect	  of	  the	  theft	  by	  the	  police.	  October	  30th	  2004,	  the	  public	  prosecutor	  decided	  that	  the	  boat	  must	  be	  returned	  back	  to	  mister	  D.	  Then	  this	  occurred.	  The	  criminal	  case	  against	  S	  is	  dismissed	  by	  the	  public	  prosecutor	  because	  of	  insufficient	  valid	  evidence.	  December	  the	  6th	  2004,	  mister	  D	  is	  summonsed	  by	  mister	  S	  to	  appear	  in	  court.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  he	  claimed	  mister	  D	  to	  hand	  over	  the	  boat	  to	  him	  (S),	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  conviction	  of	  D	  primary	  to	  pay	  the	  amount	  of	  €3,600,	  and	  secondary	  to	  a	  reasonable	  amount	  of	  finders’	  reward.	  Finally,	  S	  claims	  D	  in	  order	  to	  pay	  the	  legal	  costs.	  S	  founded	  this	  claim	  by	  stating	  that	  he	  has	  a	  right	  of	  action	  mattering	  the	  garaging	  costs	  of	  the	  boat	  as	  well	  as	  right	  of	  retention	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  which	  he	  has	  right	  to	  re-­‐claim	  the	  boat.	  How	  should	  you	  handle	  the	  case	  if	  you	  were	  mister	  D’s	  lawyer?	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